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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the shareholder wealth created through spinoff 
restructuring at Oslo Stock Exchange, over the period 1991-2010. By using a 
proxy for the transaction announcement, I find no support for an abnormal return 
in this period except for small fraction spinoffs. However, significant positive 
abnormal returns over a period reaching from 231 trading days before the spinoff 
until the first day of separate trading for the divested firms, is documented for 
cross-industry transactions, small fraction transactions as well as my whole 
sample. The study also provides significant results of long-run post abnormal 
returns for the spun-off companies up until 756 trading days after the divestiture. 
Finally, I find the portfolios of respectively small fraction- as well as own-
industry spinoffs, to perform significantly better than their counterparts of large 
fraction- and cross-industry spinoffs.  
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Introduction 
 
Varying with time, corporate transactions such as divestitures, mergers, 
acquisitions and joint ventures are common approaches in order to execute 
strategies and reallocate resources. The 1950s confidence to economies of scope 
and trend towards increased diversification, where  reversed during the 1980s 
(Comment and Jarrell 1995). Focus on conglomerate discounts and core business 
through restructuring, received on the other hand extensive attention among 
corporations. Managers were urged to streamline and specialize the firms 
operations, whereas Comment and Jarrell (1995) later proved this to be consistent 
with maximization of shareholder wealth. 
 
Additional evidences enhancing the theory of diversified firms trading at a 
discount, where documented by Berger and Ofek (1995). Through calculating 
standalone values for individual business segments within conglomerates, 
significant results revealed the existence of conglomerate discounts. Moreover, 
they found that although tax benefits and increased debt capacity was beneficial if 
successfully implemented, cross subsidization and overinvestment’s contributed 
with a proved average loss between 13% and 15%.  
 
Regarded as the mirror image of mergers, several researchers have proven that 
divestitures generate value (Comment and Jarrell 1995; Vijh 2002; Miles and 
Rosenfeld 1983; Burch and Nanda 2003). However, dependent upon the financial 
situation, the divestiture can either be done as a private or public transaction. A 
frequently used public transaction is spinoff: The parent company gives up control 
over the business unit by distributing subsidiary shares to the parent shareholders 
(Koller et al.), thereby creating a separate public company. Unlike initial public 
offerings (IPOs) and carveouts, pure spinoffs do not raise equity through sale of 
shares to new shareholders in the stock market. Thus a pure spinoff is not a direct 
action exercised in purpose of raising capital and covering liquidity needs for the 
parent company. Furthermore, the transaction forms two separate entities that can 
easily be analysed. 
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Restructuring through spinoffs are accompanied by severe redeployment of assets 
and corporate governance. Nevertheless, among the transaction motives are: 
Reduced potential for misallocation of capital, reduced information asymmetry, 
elimination of cross subsidies, prevent agency problems, and enable improved 
investment decisions (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999). On the other hand, 
such as lower human capital and elimination of synergies might negatively affect 
the firm. 
 
Another interesting characteristic of spinoffs is the subsidiaries similarity to IPOs, 
where both transactions involve newly traded shares in the market. But whereas 
comprehensive research, including Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
reveals severe long-run underperformance of IPOs, less knowledge has been 
obtained for spinoffs. Nevertheless, Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) found 
significantly positive long-run abnormal returns for these divesting firms. 
 
In this thesis I examine the value created through spinoffs at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, over the period 1991-2010. The study will start out by looking for 
abnormal returns around the announcement of transaction. However, due to 
limited access of exact announcement-date for several firms, a proxy representing 
this event will be generated. Thereafter the paper investigates the long-run 
performance for parent company, subsidiary company and an artificial 
reconstruction of the original firm. Finally, I will test the implications of the 
transaction size (measured as the fraction) and whether cross-industry spinoffs 
generate higher returns relative to own-industry spinoffs. 
 
By determining whether spinoffs increases shareholder wealth, researchers 
contributes with valuable knowledge for the economic literature. Among other 
things, it enables firms, investors and strategists to commit better decisions. 
Although the spinoff-effect has already been widely proven, less research has 
been done in the Norwegian market. Furthermore, if my data yields significant 
long-run abnormal returns, as suggested by literature, it will not only support 
previous theories. This also contradicts the basic assumption of efficient markets 
stating that investors, on average, should not be able to earn a higher return than 
justified by the market risk of the investment (Fama 1991). Thus it could be a 
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valuable contribution for investors trying to predict future stock returns, and 
thereby earning excess returns on their investments.  
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Along with an increasing focus on core business through restructuring and 
conglomerate discounts, researchers have tried to investigate the value created 
through spinoffs. However, the literature is still characterized by lack of 
knowledge, especially when it comes to hypotheses explaining the origins of 
abnormal returns from equity carveouts and spinoffs. Nevertheless, in this section 
I will highlight some of the most relevant research, which constitutes the 
foundation for the empirical design of my thesis.  
 
Spinoff announcements 
Based on 55 securities listed in the US market over the period 1963-1980, Miles 
and Rosenfeld (1983) found that voluntary spinoff announcements had a positive 
effect on shareholder wealth. Including the full 181-day observation period, they 
also found that abnormal returns where significant for both preceding interval and 
announcement day. Furthermore, they discovered that these announcements where 
usually followed up by a period of positive abnormal returns. This was in striking 
contrast to previous research on voluntary selloffs, showing no significant 
influence on the stock prices of divesting firms. Finally, their work found that 
large spinoffs had a stronger positive effect on shareholder wealth relative to 
small spinoffs. 
 
Hite and Owers (1983) also discovered evidence for positive abnormal returns, 
from 50 days prior to the announcement through completion of the spinoff. 
Nevertheless, by extending the sample to account for transaction rationales, 
positive gains existed for firms that facilitated mergers or that separated diverse 
operating units. Companies responding to legal and/or regulatory difficulties 
experienced on the other hand negative gains. By looking at a two-day interval 
surrounding the first press announcement, the researchers documented positive 
and significant results for all categories. However, they did not find support for 
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their hypothesis, that the stockholder gain represented wealth transfers from senior 
security holders such as bondholders and preferred stockholders. 
 
Predictions explaining spinoff gains 
In order to narrow down the reasons for the proved announcement effects, 
Davidson Iii and McDonald (1987) examined transactions which created royalty 
trusts. By doing so, they could observe the effect of having an explicit tax benefit 
lying behind the spinoff. This yielded presence of large and significant abnormal 
returns for the days surrounding the announcement of trust creation. The 
elimination of double taxation, on trust income, should in their point of view be 
sufficient to create this value. 
 
Allen, Lummer et al. (1995) combined spinoff discoveries with previous research 
on acquisitions, by processing a hypothesis called “correction-of-a-mistake”. They 
explored whether the excess stock returns around spinoff announcements, could 
be attributed to the reversal of prior takeover losses. This re-creation of value 
destroyed theory, contained three predictions: (1) “The acquirer’s stock price 
reaction around the announcement of a takeover that later becomes a spinoff is 
negative”; (2) “the average stock price reaction around spinoffs of prior 
acquisitions is more positive than the average stock price reaction around spinoffs 
in general”; (3) “the stock price reaction around the announcement of spinoffs of 
prior acquisitions is positive, but is negatively correlated with the stock price 
reaction around the original acquisition” (Allen et al. 1995). Through analysing 
their sample, statistical significance where only found for the first and third 
predictions. Thereby, suggesting that unsuccessful acquisitions could potentially 
be corrected through a reversal of the earlier transactions. 
 
Daley, Mehrotra et al (1997)  tested a theoretical prediction claiming that cross-
industry spinoff distributions created more value then own-industry spinoffs. This 
was simply done using the standard industrial classification (SIC) system, made 
by the United States Government. Not surprisingly, their results indicated 
significant value creation around the announcement of cross-industry spinoffs 
only. This was in line with the hypothesis for corporate focus, conglomerate 
discounts and consistent with previous discoveries from asset sale studies. 
Master Thesis GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 5 
However, they also investigated whether the observed value increase could be 
related to cross-subsidizing of poorly performing units and/or improvements in 
operating performance. Although cross-subsidizing proved to be insignificant, 
improvements in operating-return-on-assets was statistically significant for cross-
industry spinoffs. The research therefore supported the prediction that increased 
corporate focus has a positive effect on shareholder wealth. 
 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) emphasized the more unexplored 
explanations for conglomerate discounts, suggested by practitioners and press. 
Based on their theories they investigated the so called information hypothesis, 
proposing that spinoffs increase shareholder wealth by mitigating information 
asymmetry about the company. This involves increased clarity of both cash flows 
and operating efficiency, for the individual divisions within the firm. In inequality 
to separate entities, they claimed that underperformance in one unit of a 
conglomerate would spill over and affect other units. Empirical analysis’s showed 
that firms engaging in spinoffs had higher levels of information asymmetry before 
the transaction, compared to industry matched counterparts. However, as 
predicted, significant reduction in information asymmetry was documented after 
completion of the spinoff. Controlled for negative synergies between divisions, 
further studies discovered a positive relationship between the degree of 
information asymmetry and gain in firm value. Moreover, they found increased 
probability for spinoff transactions if the company had liquidity needs or high 
growth opportunities. Nevertheless, in the two year post-period, significantly 
more capital was raised both in amount and frequency. This was consistent with 
Dierkens (1991) findings, that firms time their equity issue announcement when 
their information asymmetry is relatively low. 
 
Through loss of collateral and reduced liquidation value, Parrino (1997) argued 
that spinoffs increased the riskiness of the bondholders claim. By studying the 
Marriott spinoff in 1993, he discovered both a decline in the overall enterprise 
value as well as a wealth transfer from senior security holders to shareholders. In 
order to find systematic evidence supporting this wealth expropriation hypothesis, 
Maxwell and Rao (2003), collected comprehensive data on spinoff 
announcements. Consistent with the “Mariott Case”, significant results proved 
that bondholders on average received a negative abnormal return. This 
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emphasized a wealth transfer from bondholders to common stockholders, and was 
a breakthrough for the corporate focus literature. However, unlike Parrino’s 
(1997) findings, the total firm value increased on a spinoff announcement. This 
advocated that the wealth expropriation hypothesis was only a partial explanation 
for the stockholder gain. Additionally, Maxwell and Rao (2003) where able to 
find several relationships:  (1) “The loss of collateral, measured by the relative 
size of the spun-off firm, is positively related to stockholder returns and is 
negatively related to bondholder returns”; (2) “the risk of a firm’s debt, measured 
by bond ratings and leverage ratios, negatively influences bondholder returns”; (3) 
“consistent with a loss to bondholders, firms are more likely to have their credit 
rating downgraded than upgraded after a spinoff”; (4) “consistent with the wealth 
transfer hypothesis, losses to bondholders tend to be more severe, the larger the 
gains to shareholders” (Maxwell and Rao 2003). 
 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2008) re-examined the stockholder-bondholder 
conflict, proposed by earlier research on corporate spinoffs. Through contradicting 
both Maxwell and Rao (2003) and Parrino (1997), they claimed that the wealth 
transfer theory was inconsistent with more modern markets. Based on data 
covering the period from 1995 to 2002, evidence showed that both stocks and 
straight bonds experienced significant abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement. Moreover, by dividing the bond sample in two sub-periods, they 
observed insignificant negative abnormal returns between 1995 and 1997, 
whereas positive and significant results where proven in the period 1998-2002. 
The discovery thereby suggested that previous experiences had resulted in an 
immunization and adaption against the stockholder-bondholder conflict. 
 
By using a spinoff sample, Burch and Nanda (2003) explored the field of 
conglomerate discounts and diversity costs. They were able to address 
improvements in overall value, through reconstructing the original firm after the 
transaction and use market-to-book values for diversity. This approach raised 
critique against previous research, claiming that methods relying on standard 
industrial classification (SIC) system could yield noisy and biased results. 
Nevertheless, improvement in excess value where proved by Burch and Nanda to 
be an implication of both reductions in diversity and changes in investment 
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policy. Thereby valuable support was given to the theory of conglomerate 
discounts and the diversity cost hypothesis.  
 
Consistent with previous research, Ahn and Denis (2004) observed an increase in 
firm value and an elimination of the conglomerate discount following spinoffs. 
Evidence where provided supporting the inefficient investment hypothesis, 
arguing that changes in investment policy contributed to these well investigated 
discoveries. Through studying changes in the allocation of financial resources 
within conglomerates, they found a significant increase in efficiency after the 
divestiture. In line with this, reliable relationship where provided between change 
in firm value around the spinoff and change in investment efficiency. Finally, they 
concluded that improved allocation of financial resources could not solely account 
for the change in excess value.  
  
Long-run stock market performance following spinoff transactions 
Cusatis, Miles et al. (1993) extended the previous research made on abnormal 
returns around spinoff announcements, to include for long-run performance. Since 
both IPOs and spinoff subsidiaries represents newly traded securities in the 
market, equal characteristics would be reasonable. However, unlike IPOs who 
appears to underperform the market (Ritter 1991), they found that spinoff 
subsidiaries, parent companies and a reconstruction of the original firms yielded 
significant long-run abnormal returns. By working on the prediction that these 
findings were an implication of restructuring activity, they discovered an 
unusually high frequency of takeovers for both the spinoffs and parents. As 
previous empirical results show that target shareholders on average receives a 
30% premium over their stock’s announcement price (Koller et al.), the abnormal 
return was positive but insignificant when removing the firms involved in 
takeover. Along with these striking results, critics were raised stating that earlier 
research had underestimated the effect on shareholder wealth created by spinoffs. 
Cusatis, Miles et al. (1993) therefore interfered with the merging and acquisition 
(M&A) literature, suggesting that spinoffs increased synergies for potential 
bidders and established low-cost methods to transfer company assets. 
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Desai and Jain (1999) supported the research performed by Daley, Mehrotra et al 
(1997), claiming that cross-industry spinoff distributions created more value than 
own-industry spinoffs. However, these studies did not include the post-spinoff 
long-run stock market performance. Based on this, further investigation was 
dedicated directly to the corporate focus literature. In line with their expectations, 
significant results viewed that focus increasing (cross-industry) spinoffs provided 
a larger abnormal return than non-focus increasing (own-industry) spinoffs, for 
both the announcement period as well as in the long-run. By running cross-
sectional regressions, stock market performance and operating performance 
proved to be significantly related to change in focus. Finally, they discovered that 
companies implementing non-focus increasing spinoffs were often motivated by 
separating poorly performing subsidiaries. Debt reduction, transferring of debt and 
financial distress, were on the other hand insignificant triggers for these 
transactions. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Previous research on different stock exchanges over the world, presents 
significant results concluding that spinoff announcements has a positive effect on 
shareholder wealth. As addressed in the literature review, several hypotheses seek 
to explain this anomaly. So far, no paper has managed to find an exact factor 
solely accounting for the proved abnormal returns. However, based on all this 
empirical research, I formulate the first hypothesis which is expected to yield 
significant results at Oslo Stock Exchange as well: 
  
Hypothesis 1; 
“Companies experiences positive abnormal returns around the announcement of 
spinoffs” 
 
Additionally, with inspiration from more modern discoveries, I also wish to 
investigate the long-run stock performance from spinoff transactions. Associated 
with severe restructuring activity, post-spinoff findings indicate that market 
participants underestimate the shareholder wealth created through spinoffs. I 
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thereby form further expectations of positive long-run abnormal returns following 
spinoffs, up until 756 trading days after the transactions: 
 
Hypothesis 2; 
“Parent companies experiences positive abnormal returns over an extended 
period following the spinoff transactions” 
 
Hypothesis 3; 
“Subsidiary companies experiences positive abnormal returns over an extended 
period following the spinoff transactions” 
 
Hypothesis 4; 
“The parent-subsidiary reconstructions experiences positive abnormal returns 
over an extended period following the spinoff transactions” 
 
In order to investigate the implications of the transaction size (measured as the 
fraction) as well as the effect of cross-industry (focus increasing) spinoffs relative 
to own-industry (non-focus increasing) spinoffs, I simply reallocate the portfolios. 
Nevertheless, equivalent with previous research combined with theories of 
conglomerate discounts, the following sub-hypotheses are likely to yield 
interesting results: The large spinoffs should generate higher abnormal returns 
relative to small spinoffs as the value creation should be proportional with the 
fraction size. Secondly, cross-industry spinoffs are expected to generate higher 
abnormal returns then own-industry spinoffs, as they should have a greater impact 
on the reduction of a firms’ diversity (diversity cost hypothesis). By constituting 
the foundation for my remaining research at Oslo Stock Exchange, I further 
formulate two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5; 
“Large spinoff fractions generates higher abnormal returns relative to small 
spinoff fractions” 
 
Hypothesis 6; 
“Cross-industry spinoffs generates higher abnormal returns then own-industry 
spinoffs” 
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Data 
 
In this thesis I define a spinoff as a transaction where the parent company gives up 
control over a business unit by distributing subsidiary shares to the parent 
shareholders, and thereby creating a separate public company. This is normally 
done through a per-rata stock distribution to the parent stockholders. A stricter 
definition of my events was not preferable, as it required unavailable information 
and induced a comprehensive sample reduction. 
 
With assistance from the Oslo Stock Exchange administration, I where able to 
obtain a complete list over reported spinoffs at the OSE in the period between 
1985 and 2010. However, by only containing security id of parent company and 
date of event (completion of the spinoff takes place), a comprehensive data search 
where required. In order to obtain the spinoff subsidiary, I went through both the 
Oslo Stock Information (OBI) database and news archives. This identified a total 
of 71 transactions, whereas several of them were excluded due to statistical 
interactions with the methodology in this thesis. 
 
Table 1 shows both the distribution of spinoffs over time, as well as the mean 
market value (closing equity market value at the first day of separate trading) of 
the spun-off firms each year. First of all the statistics reveals that the average 
transaction size varies severely, whereas year 1993, year 1995, year 1996 and year 
2006 represents outliers. Secondly, the number of spinoffs per period only reaches 
from 0 to 8, even though the transaction frequency is highly volatile.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the spinoff transactions over the period 1991-2010 
Based on my original sample consisting of 71 announcements, I excluded stocks that did not fulfill my 
spinoff definition, companies performing more than one spinoff within a year as well as other transactions 
that inferred with the methodology of this thesis. The final data used in the calculation of abnormal returns 
consists of 66 spinoffs over the period 1991-2010. 
Year
Number of 
spinoffs
Mean market 
valuea (NOK 
millions) Year
Number of 
spinoffs
Mean market 
valuea (NOK 
millions)
1991 2 372,8 2001 8 608,5
1992 1 385,2 2002 2 145,2
1993 2 39,0 2003 1 117,8
1994 0 0,0 2004 2 145,2
1995 6 60,4 2005 4 414,4
1996 2 4 561,2 2006 3 1 126,6
1997 4 649,1 2007 7 370,6
1998 7 86,5 2008 2 98,7
1999 5 213,5 2009 0 0,0
2000 6 122,5 2010 2 763,2
aClosing equity market value (share price spinoff × number of shares outstanding) is calculated at the 
first day of separate trading
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
 
 
Moreover, I calculate the market value of the subsidiary company relative to the 
original parent company at the first day of separate trading. This information 
indicates a positive skewed distribution displayed in figure 1, whereas 
approximately 83% of the transactions lie in the interval between 0% and 39%. 
Nevertheless, the data enables me to create exclusive portfolios with either large- 
or small spinoff fractions. By doing so, I am able to test the hypothesis that large 
spinoffs have a stronger positive effect on shareholder wealth relative to small 
spinoffs (based on fractions). The group of large transactions includes those firms 
whose subsidiary company have an equity market value of 20% or more of the 
equity market value of the original reconstructed firm, at the first day of separate 
trading (  [     ]      ⁄                                       ). I 
argue that this will yield relevant results, even though the portfolios containing 
large transactions has higher spread internally relative to the portfolios containing 
small transactions. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of the spinoff fractions over the period 1991-2010 
aEquity market value of subsidiary
bEquity market value of parent
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Figure 1 displays the distribution of   [     ]⁄  in my final sample of 66 transactions. This implies the 
equity market value of the subsidiary company as a percentage of the equity market value of the original 
reconstructed parent company (parent company and subsidiary company) at the first day of separate trading. 
 
Based on Mitchell and Stafford (2000) asserting that daily returns might yield 
noise in the test statistics, I generate returns through intervals of 21 trading days1. 
In order to include for dividend payments, adjusted stock returns and market 
values were retrieved from the OBI database by Oslo Stock Exchange (Ødegaard 
2011). My sample reaches from 231 trading days (day -231) prior to completion 
of the spinoff, through 756 trading days (day 756) after the transaction. Due to 
several varying sequences of price-sensitive announcements and press-releases in 
the pre-spinoff interval, the individual announcement events have different 
lengths of time. Unfortunately, all this relevant information is not available for my 
sample of securities, forcing me to use a proxy representing the announcement 
period. 
 
In order to measure the companies’ performance, I employ several benchmarks 
described more comprehensive in the methodology. However, both the Oslo Børs 
Market Index and the different industry indexes were generated as well as 
extracted from Datastream by Thomson Reuters. Moreover, by continuing the 
OBI database and news archives search, I gathered information concerning 
                                                 
1 21 trading days represents a regular calendar month 
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industry classification codes (GICS-codes), delisting’s2, acquisitions3 and other 
corporate transactions during the observation period. 
 
Panel A in table 2 lists the sector breakdown for the spinoff transactions, using the 
GICS system introduced by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). The 
parent companies span all 10 sectors in the GICS system, whereas the subsidiary 
companies only span 8 sectors. However, the largest concentrations for both 
groups are within energy, industrials and information technology, accounting for 
respectively 69.7% of the parent companies and 76.9% of the subsidiary 
companies. This pattern corresponds well with the structure of Oslo Stock 
Exchange, which is severely clustered into these few sectors (including the 
financial sector) over the testing period (Ødegaard 2011).  
 
Table 2 
Sector classification of the spinoffs at event date 
Information about sector classifications are based on the GICS system, retrieved from the OBI database. 
Parent- or subsidiary companies denied listing or by other reasons not registered on Oslo Stock Exchange at 
the event date, are excluded from this table. The final sample consists of 64 parent companies and 52 
subsidiary companies from the period 1991-2010. 
GICSa
10 Energy 13 8
15 Materials 2 3
20 Industrials 12 15
25 Consumer Discretionary 7 1
30 Consumer Staples 2 1
35 Health Care 2 2
40 Financials 5 5
45 Information Technology 21 17
50 Telecomunication Services 1 0
55 Utilities 1 0
10 Energy 5 3
15 Materials 0 2
20 Industrials 2 8
25 Consumer Discretionary 3 0
30 Consumer Staples 1 0
35 Health Care 1 1
40 Financials 3 4
45 Information Technology 2 1
50 Telecomunication Services 1 0
55 Utilities 1 0
aGlobal Industry Classification Standard
Panel B: Sector classification cross-industry sample
Industry Parents Subsidiaries
Panel A: Sector classification full sample
   
                                                 
2 If a company was delisted, the longest available return was used to represent the whole period. 
3 If a company was acquired, the longest available return was used to represent the whole period. 
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Moreover, I narrow down the sample by characterize all companies spinning off a 
subsidiary within the same GICS sector code as an own-industry transaction. 
Based on this definition, panel B shows the remaining firms performing a cross-
industry spinoff. However, even though the sample only counts a total of 19 
transactions, it still weights towards the same sectors as in panel A. This filtering 
enables me to examine my last hypothesis; whether the cross-industry (focus 
increasing) transactions yield higher returns and lower significance level then the 
own-industry (non-focus increasing) transactions. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Several approaches are available in order to measure abnormal stock returns, 
whereas comprehensive research addresses the empirical power and test statistics 
in these methodologies. With pros and cons for each technique, the literature 
contains inconsistent results for preferred methodology. Nevertheless, statistical 
inference can either be drawn from a calendar-time framework (factor/market 
models) or an event-time framework (buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns). Although a substantial difference in anomalies, 
they all struggle with a common problem pointed out by defenders of market 
efficiency: The sample and their actual returns must be compared to some kind of 
benchmark containing “normal returns”. Choice of benchmark and framework is 
difficult to justify, and may easily lead to biased test statistics. Based on this, I 
will start out by shortly review some of the most recognized methodology 
contributions, constituting the foundation for my statistics. 
 
By criticizing the matched firm technique for not adequately adjust for risk, Espen 
Eckbo, Masulis et al. (2000)  accused this method of generating seriously biased 
estimates. On the other hand, they highlighted the factor model as a more reliable 
tool for measuring long-run abnormal stock returns. This was in striking contrast 
to previous research by Barber and Lyon (1997), claiming that the method of 
matching sample firms to control firms yielded well-specified test statistics in 
random samples. Moreover, Barber and Lyon (1997) argued that the use of 
reference portfolios could generate test statistics that are misspecified. However, 
in this paper I will calculate the equally weighted (EW) Cumulative Abnormal 
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Return (CAR) as well as the EW Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR), both 
of them with reference portfolios as benchmarks. By doing so the misspecification 
of test statistics can largely be traced to: New listing bias, overlapping returns, 
rebalancing bias and skewness bias (Barber and Lyon 1997). 
 
The benchmark-adjusted return (AR) and CAR for firm i in interval t is expressed 
in the following way: 
                        
     ∑     
 
   
 
Furthermore, in order to calculate the mean CAR4 I take the EW average of the 
individual CARs: 
    (
 
 
)∑    
 
   
 
Although Lyon, Barber et al. (1999) favors the methodology of BHAR, they 
highlights that the CAR approach yields less skewed abnormal returns. Suffering 
mostly from new listing- and rebalancing bias, less statistical problems arises 
when processing the data. On the other hand, the CAR also struggles with 
sampling biases (size, book-to-market, pre-event returns, calendar clustering, 
industry clustering and overlapping returns) and can be biased predictors of 
BHARs (Barber and Lyon 1997). This might lead to incorrect inferences. Barber 
and Lyon (1997) also claims that the indicated magnitude of wealth created, does 
not correspond to the returns generated by the benchmark. 
 
The BHAR is expressed in the following way: 
 
           ∏(      )
 
   
 ∏(              )
 
   
 
Whereas the mean BHAR5 contains the EW average of the individual BHARs: 
     (
 
 
)∑     
 
   
 
                                                 
4 The t-statistics for the mean CAR is calculated as: 
    
 (    ) √ ⁄
 
5 The t-statistics for the mean BHAR is calculated as: 
     
 (     ) √ ⁄
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By conducting estimates for abnormal returns that easily reflects investors’ 
experiences, researchers seem to prefer BHAR. Moreover, as previously 
mentioned, Barber and Lyon (1997) argues that CAR is a biased predictor of 
BHAR. However, the measure does suffer from new listing biases and skewness 
biases, generally yielding negative bias in the test-statistics.  
 
Preferably, I would like to measure abnormal returns using both market models 
and benchmarks such as: The CAPM model, Fama & French 3-Factor model, a 
six-factor model with pre-specified macroeconomic factors suggested by Espen 
Eckbo, Masulis et al. (2000), different reference portfolios and matched-firms. 
However, due to limitations of my dataset (such as lack of book-to-market ratios) 
and the scope of this paper, I will compare the transaction returns with the 
following benchmarks: 
 
 The announcement period returns will be compared against a value-
weighted (VW) Norwegian market index, constructed by Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. This benchmark includes dividend payments, and 
represents the theoretical aggregate growth in the value of its constituents. 
The intuition behind this benchmark is that pre-spinoff companies are on 
average more diversified than the post-spinoff companies. 
 
 As previously mentioned, companies increases focus on core business 
through spinoffs in general. However, this varies severely, especially with 
respect to own-industry spinoffs versus cross-industry spinoffs. 
Nevertheless, I compare the long-run performance of parent- and 
subsidiary companies against their respective industry indexes. These 
benchmarks, constructed by Thomson Reuters Datastream, include 
dividend payments and represent the theoretical aggregate growth in the 
value of their constituents. 
 
 Post-spinoff returns for the reconstructed artificial firms are compared 
against the same benchmark as for abnormal returns around 
announcement. In order to reconstruct the original firm, I weight each 
parent- and subsidiary company by its respective relative market values at 
the transaction date. This enables me to calculate the raw returns, and 
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thereby the long-run performance for the reconstructed parent-subsidiary 
companies. 
 
Oslo Stock Exchange reported 258 listed companies in 2010, developed from 172 
listed companies in 1991 (Ødegaard 2011). Attention should be dedicated to the 
possibility that some of the benchmarks used, might be influenced by the spinoff-
events themselves. Through enabling such overlapping returns, my approach 
yields bias in the test statistics. This limitation is likely to be most severe in the 
industry indexes, as these benchmarks have the highest probability of containing 
large fractions of spinoff companies. 
 
In order to compare the transaction performances in hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 
6, I use a test for inference between dependent samples (Triola 2010). The 
difference (D) in return (R) between portfolio i1 and i2, in interval t is expressed 
in the following way: 
               
By relying on this method the t-statistics6 will be sensitive against small samples, 
which might affect the robustness of some calculated t-statistics.  
 
 
Empirical results 
 
Pre-spinoff performance 
After evaluating the information gathered from press releases, board decisions and 
rumors, I include day -231 through day -21 in the proxy representing the spinoff 
announcements. As reported in table 3, neither the CAR calculations nor the 
BHAR calculations for the sample as a whole support my first hypothesis with 
significant t-statistics over this period. However, both of them yield positive 
abnormal returns of respectively 7.0% (mean CAR) and 18.5% (mean BHAR). 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The t-statistics for the dependent samples is calculated as: 
(  )⁄ ∑ (    )
 
   
 ( ) √ ⁄
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Table 3 
Abnormal returns for spinoff announcements 
The reaction to spinoff announcements are measured using cumulative abnormal returns as well as buy-and-
hold abnormal returns, both of them with a value weighted (VW) Norwegian market index as benchmark. 
Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a stock minus the monthly 
benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day period. The portfolios are rebalanced every 21 trading 
day, and are based on the final sample of 66 transactions over the period 1991-2010. The first day of separate 
trading for parent companies and subsidiary companies are represented by 0 in the table below. Over the 
trading period day -231 through day 0, I find that respectively 67% (CAR) and 61% (BHAR) of the firms 
contributes with positive return to their portfolios. 
-210 -1,0 % -0,53 -1,0 % -0,53 -1,0 % -0,53
-189 3,3 % 1,13 2,3 % 0,81 1,4 % 0,54
-168 3,7 % 1,79* 6,0 % 1,71* 6,1 % 1,59
-147 0,5 % 0,20 6,5 % 1,62 5,5 % 1,33
-126 0,3 % 0,17 6,7 % 1,41 7,2 % 1,35
-105 0,3 % 0,12 7,0 % 1,31 8,6 % 1,34
-84 2,1 % 1,00 9,0 % 1,58 11,9 % 1,44
-63 1,5 % 0,93 10,5 % 1,69* 15,4 % 1,49
-42 -3,2 %  -2,02** 7,3 % 1,09 13,6 % 1,26
-21 -0,3 % -0,17 7,0 % 0,98 18,5 % 1,20
0 7,6 % 1,88* 14,6 % 1,86* 24,4 % 1,70*
aThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean AR equal zero
bThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean CAR equal zero
cThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean BHAR equal zero
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
Mean ARt
Mean    
CAR-231,t
Trading 
period
t-stata t-statb
Mean 
BHAR-231,t
t-statc
 
 
By looking at the calculations surrounding the different trading intervals, I find 
significant mean positive ARs on a 10% level for; day -189 through day -168 and 
day -21 through day 0. On the other hand, day -63 through day -42 shows a 
negative AR significant on a 5% level. These divergent results becomes less 
apparent when looking at the mean CARs, where the regressions yields significant 
positive results on a 10% level for the trading periods; day -231 through day -168 
(mean CAR equal to 6.0%), day -231 through day -63 (mean CAR equal to 
10.5%) and day -231 through day 0 (mean CAR equal to 14.6%). Moreover, with 
a t-statistic of 1.70 significant on a 10% level and a mean BHAR of 24.4% over 
the corresponding last period (day -231 through day 0), I find further support for 
the theory of conglomerate discounts. 
 
Based on the results in table 3, it seems like the last trading interval (day -21 
through day 0) is important for the value creation through spinoffs. Experience 
reveals that the execution of corporate transactions on stock exchanges is severely 
dependent on the macroeconomic environment, as well as other externalities. It 
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thereby seems like the confirmation of a successful transaction is vital for a full 
release of a potential conglomerate discount, as the last trading interval normally 
possesses this information.  
 
Post-spinoff performance 
In order to investigate the post-spinoff performance for the total sample of 
transactions, I continue to measure abnormal returns with CAR and BHAR. 
However, in this section the benchmarks will differ from the announcement 
period, as described more comprehensive in the methodology.  
 
Table 4 
Long-run cumulative abnormal returns for spinoff transactions 
The post-spinoff performance below is measured using cumulative abnormal returns, where each of the three 
portfolios uses different benchmarks. Panel A and panel B, contain firms that are paired against individual 
VW Norwegian industry indexes, whereas the firms in panel C are compared against a VW Norwegian 
market index. Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a stock minus 
the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day period. The portfolios are rebalanced 
every 21 trading day, and are based on the final sample of 66 transactions over the period 1991-2010. The 
first day of separate trading for parent companies and subsidiary companies are represented by 0 in the table 
below. 
Mean CAR
t-statistica
Percentage positive
Firms delisted or acquired
Mean CAR
t-statistica
Percentage positive
Firms delisted or acquired
Mean CAR
t-statistica
Percentage positive
aThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean CAR equal zero
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
0,31 0,70
27,8 % 45,0 % 52,5 %
Panel C: Reconstructed Companies
58,0 % 56,9 % 58,8 %
2,21** 2,20** 2,61***
58,8 % 63,5 % 59,6 %
13,7 % 30,8 % 38,5 %
5,7 % 4,0 % 8,5 %
0,56
Holding period (CAR)
(0-252) (0-504) (0-756)
43,8 % 46,9 % 50,0 %
Panel B: Subsidiary Companies
Panel A: Parent Companies
-3,2 % -8,5 % -7,5 %
-0,31 -0,63 -0,52
6,3 % 16,7 % 10,0 %
 
 
Panel B in table 4 presents support for my third hypothesis, with significant t-
statistics on a 5% level over the two trading periods day 0 through day 252 (mean 
CAR equal to 27.8%) and day 0 through day 504 (mean CAR equal to 45.0%), for 
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the subsidiary companies. Furthermore, the trading period day 0 through day 756 
yields a mean CAR of 52.5% and are significantly different from zero on a 2% 
level. These results corresponds well with the BHAR measurements presented in 
table 5, where the subsidiary companies generates significant t-statistics on a 5% 
level over the trading periods day 0 through day 504 (mean BHAR equal to 
48.6%) and day 0 through day 756 (mean BHAR equal to 49.6%). On the other 
hand, the portfolios of parent companies and reconstructed companies do not 
generate significant results in any of my regressions.  
 
Table 5 
Long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns for spinoff transactions 
The post-spinoff performance below is measured using buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where each of the 
three portfolios uses different benchmarks. Panel A and panel B, contain firms that are paired against 
individual VW Norwegian industry indexes, whereas the firms in panel C are compared against a VW 
Norwegian market index. Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a 
stock minus the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day period. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every 21 trading day, and are based on the final sample of 66 transactions over the period 1991-
2010. The first day of separate trading for parent companies and subsidiary companies are represented by 0 in 
the table below. 
Mean BHAR
t-statistica
Percentage positive
Firms delisted or acquired
Mean BHAR
t-statistica
Percentage positive
Firms delisted or acquired
Mean BHAR
t-statistica
Percentage positive
aThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean BHAR equal zero
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
Panel A: Parent Companies
Holding period (BHAR)
(0-756)(0-504)(0-252)
1,5 % 5,8 % -6,3 %
0,16
39,7 %
6,3 %
0,24
34,4 %
16,7 %
-0,35
37,5 %
10,0 %
20,9 % 48,6 % 49,6 %
Panel B: Subsidiary Companies
1,67 2,14** 2,05**
Panel C: Reconstructed Companies
0,85 0,83 0,44
51,0 % 51,9 % 50,0 %
13,7 % 30,8 % 38,5 %
50,0 % 49,0 % 45,1 %
8,6 % 17,5 % 6,9 %
 
 
The largest fraction of firms generating positive abnormal returns is discovered 
within the portfolios of subsidiary companies. This holds for both measurement 
methods. Secondly, the descriptive statistics also reveal that these firms 
experienced the highest frequency of delisting’s and acquisitions in the post-
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spinoff period. As previous empirical research find that target shareholders on 
average receives an estimated 30% premium over their stock’s announcement 
price (Koller et al.), the abnormal return might be traced to M&A activity. This 
suggests that the spinoff transactions could increase the synergies for potential 
bidders, and establish low cost methods to transfer company assets. Conversely, 
the firms that are dropped by Oslo Stock Exchange for failure to meet listing 
criteria are not likely to be good performers, and contradict such a hypothesis. 
Moreover, the subsidiary companies also share equal characteristics with IPOs by 
representing newly traded securities in the market. However, the results differ 
severely from findings on IPOs (who tend to underperform the market and peers), 
as my sample provides significant positive long-term abnormal returns over the 
corresponding periods. 
 
Large versus small spinoff fractions 
The performance of the two subsamples based on the size of the spun-off units are 
measured using the same methodology as in previous calculations, and could 
reveal a proportional value creation in my data. As presented in table 6, none of 
the portfolios containing large spinoff fractions provide statistical support for the 
presence of abnormal returns within the testing period. This differs severely from 
the results for small spinoff fractions, which yields both comprehensive abnormal 
returns as well as significant t-statistics. Panel B1 reports a significance level 
between 2% and 10% for all calculated CAR periods, except for the interval day -
231 through day -210 and the trading period day -231 through day -189. These 
findings suggest that companies experiences positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement of small spinoff fractions. Less supportive data towards this 
hypothesis is on the other hand presented in Panel B2, as it contains insignificant 
t-statistic for the defined announcement period. 
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Table 6 
Abnormal returns for large/small fraction spinoff announcements 
The reaction to respectively large- and small fraction spinoff announcements are measured using cumulative 
abnormal returns as well as buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Both methods with a VW Norwegian market 
index as benchmark. Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a stock 
minus the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day period. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every 21 trading day, and contain 56% large fraction transactions and 44% small fraction 
transactions over the period 1991-2010. The first day of separate trading for parent companies and subsidiary 
companies are represented by 0 in the table below. 
-210 -3,3 % -1,08 0,2 % 0,07 -3,5 %
-189 3,6 % 0,81 2,0 % 0,43 1,6 % 0,188
-168 5,0 % 1,10 10,5 % 1,86* -5,5 % -0,501
-147 4,6 % 0,86 12,4 % 2,02* -7,8 % -0,756
-126 5,7 % 0,91 16,0 % 2,11** -10,3 % -1,032
-105 5,6 % 0,72 17,9 % 2,11** -12,4 % -1,263
-84 6,3 % 0,76 21,5 % 2,36** -15,2 % -1,564
-63 5,5 % 0,64 24,2 % 2,49*** -18,7 % -1,93*
-42 5,2 % 0,57 20,9 % 2,12** -15,7 % -1,426
-21 -0,4 % -0,04 21,7 % 1,95* -22,1 % -1,86**
0 15,9 % 1,17 26,2 % 2,39** -10,2 % -0,558
aThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean CAR equal zero
bThe t-statistics test if the CAR of the large/small spinoffs are significantly different
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
-210 -3,3 % -1,08 0,2 % 0,07 -3,5 %
-189 0,7 % 0,19 2,6 % 0,58 -1,9 % -0,36
-168 2,4 % 0,49 12,3 % 1,88* -9,9 % -1,17
-147 2,0 % 0,32 12,1 % 1,92* -10,1 % -1,18
-126 2,8 % 0,40 18,7 % 2,04* -15,9 % -1,79
-105 4,7 % 0,54 21,9 % 1,94* -17,2 % -1,93
-84 6,2 % 0,63 27,6 % 1,77* -21,4 % -2,40*
-63 4,5 % 0,45 34,8 % 1,70* -30,3 % -2,86**
-42 5,9 % 0,54 31,8 % 1,49 -26,0 % -1,95*
-21 2,5 % 0,19 43,5 % 1,38 -41,1 % -2,28**
0 16,2 % 1,00 46,7 % 1,67 -30,5 % -1,32
aThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean BHAR equal zero
bThe t-statistics test if the BHAR of the large/small spinoffs are significantly different
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
Panel A1 Panel B1 Panel C1
Panel A2 Panel B2 Panel C2
Large mean 
CAR-231,t
Small  mean 
CAR-231,t
Large minus 
small
Large minus 
small
t-statb
t-statb
t-stata
t-stata
Trading 
period
Large mean 
BHAR-231,t
t-stata
Small  mean 
BHAR-231,t
Trading 
period
t-stata
  
By comparing the returns between the two portfolios of respectively large- and 
small fraction spinoffs, I find contradictions to my fifth hypothesis. Providing a 
totally opposite relationship then projected, the small spinoff fractions tend to 
outperform the large spinoff fractions over the announcement period (panel C1 -
22.1% and panel C2 -41.1%). This relationship is found to be significant at the 
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5% level in both methodologies (CAR and BHAR). Also shorter trading periods 
provides similar results that support this interesting finding. However, by 
including the last trading interval, I no longer find a significant difference in 
return between the two portfolios. 
 
Moreover, the long-run post-spinoff performance and the implicit difference in 
return of the two groups of transactions are presented in table 7. Although not 
statistically significant, my sample of large fraction parent companies outperforms 
the market in all three periods. Whereas the portfolio of small fraction parent 
companies underperforms over the same periods, providing significant t-statistic 
at the 10% level (CAR) as well as the 5% level (BHAR) for day 0 through day 
756. A comparison of these two groups documents no additional consistent 
results, other than a comprehensive positive difference in return for the sample. 
 
By generating significant t-statistics between 2% and 10% for all periods except 
day 0 through day 252 (the BHAR calculation), the sample of small fraction 
subsidiary companies seem to offer a long-run abnormal value creation. 
Furthermore, I find these portfolios to yield the most severe returns in my study, 
with BHAR’s ranging from 18.6% to 88.1% and CAR’s ranging from 34.9% to 
76.5%. The large fraction subsidiary companies on the other hand, provide 
insignificant t-statistics and inconsistent abnormal returns. Nevertheless, over the 
trading period day 0 through day 504, I actually find that the small subsidiary 
spinoff fractions generate significantly higher mean CAR relative to the large 
subsidiary spinoff fractions at the 10% level.  Apart from this, panel B1 and B2 
only documents a severely volatile difference in value creation between the two 
portfolios for the remaining periods. 
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Table 7 
Long-run abnormal returns for large/small fraction spinoff transactions 
The post-spinoff performance of respectively large- and small fraction transactions is measured using 
cumulative abnormal returns as well as buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Whereas each of the three groups of 
companies uses different benchmarks. Panel A1/A2 and panel B1/B2 contain firms that are paired against 
individual VW Norwegian industry indexes, whereas the firms in panel C1/C2 are compared against a VW 
Norwegian market index. Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a 
stock minus the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day period. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every 21 trading day, and are based on the final sample of 66 transactions over the period 1991-
2010. The first day of separate trading for parent companies and subsidiary companies are represented by 0 in 
the table below. Finally, the significance levels denoted on the abnormal returns for each portfolio tests the 
hypothesis that the mean CAR or mean BHAR equal zero. 
Mean CAR large
Mean CAR small
Large minus small
t-statistica
Mean BHAR large
Mean BHAR small
Large minus small
t-statisticb
Mean CAR large
Mean CAR small
Large minus small
t-statistica
Mean BHAR large
Mean BHAR small
Large minus small
t-statisticb
Mean CAR large
Mean CAR small
Large minus small
t-statistica
Mean BHAR large
Mean BHAR small
Large minus small
t-statisticb
Large parent
Small parent
Large subsidiary
Small subsidiary
aThe t-statistics test if the CAR of the large/small spinoffs are significantly different
bThe t-statistics test if the BHAR of the large/small spinoffs are significantly different
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
7 % 22 % 30 %
29 % 33 %
22 % 35 % 43 %
0 % 13 % 23 %
Panel D: Companies delisted or acquired
13 %
18,9 %
Large versus small spinoffs
(0-252) (0-504) (0-756)
Panel A2: Parent Companies, large minus small (BHAR)
Panel A1: Parent Companies, large minus small (CAR)
19,6 % 18,0 % 19,7 %
-9,0 % -23,4 % -32,3%*
28,7 % 41,4 % 51,9 %
0,95 1,27 1,53
Panel B2: Subsidiary Companies, large minus small (BHAR)
-6,5 % -5,7 % -26,7%**
23,1 %
12,3 % -2,4 % 8,3 %
34,9%* 71,4%*** 76,5%***
33,1 %
20,6 % -5,2 % -12,1 %
29,5 % 38,8 % 45,6 %
1,19 1,38 1,16
-22,6 % -73,7 % -68,3 %
-0,96 -2,02* -1,65
Panel B1: Subsidiary Companies, large minus small (CAR)
18,6 % 80,6%** 88,1%**
2,0 % -85,8 % -100,1 %
-10,0 % -5,8 % -13,7 %
0,06 -1,57 -1,53
Panel C1: Reconstructed Companies, large minus small (CAR)
26,6 % 30,6 % 36,6%*
-11,9 % -18,5 % -15,2 %
1,80* 1,53 1,10
38,5 % 49,1 % 51,8 %
41,3 % 51,7 % 45,8 %
1,39 1,63 1,64
Panel C2: Reconstructed Companies, large minus small (BHAR)
31,2 % 45,9 % 32,1 %
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Also the artificial reconstruction of the parent companies has been divided into 
either a large fraction portfolio or a small fraction portfolio in table 7. This 
separation forms a pattern where the large fraction reconstructed companies 
obtains positive abnormal returns, and the small fraction reconstructed companies 
generates negative abnormal returns. However, none of these results yields 
significant t-statistics, except for the mean CAR for the large fraction 
reconstructed companies over the trading period day 0 through day 756 
(significant at the 10% level). These findings are further reflected in the difference 
between the portfolios, which are positive in all periods for both the CAR- and the 
BHAR calculations. Significant t-statistic for the comparison of the two types of 
transactions, is on the other hand only generated in panel C2 over the trading 
period day 0 through day 252 (significant at the 10% level). Finally, based on the 
descriptive statistics in panel D, I find no consistent indication of a linkage 
between companies being delisted or acquired and abnormal returns for the post-
spinoff period. 
 
Cross-industry versus own-industry spinoff transactions 
Defining the companies performing a cross-industry spinoff as a focus increasing 
transaction and the companies performing an own-industry spinoff as a non-focus 
increasing transaction, enables me to provide further knowledge to the diversity 
cost hypothesis. Based on the same methodologies as in previous calculations, 
neither the cross-industry nor the own-industry spinoffs generate significant t-
statistics over the announcement period. Nevertheless, the own-industry 
transactions tend to perform well in my sample with positive abnormal returns in 
all measured periods. This is further supported by panel B1 presenting significant 
abnormal returns on a 10% level for the trading periods day -231 through day -63 
and day -231 through day 0, whereas panel B2 shows a significant abnormal 
return (at the 10% level) for the trading period day -231 through day 0. The cross-
industry transactions in panel A1 and A2 are on the other hand less consistent, by 
generating both positive and negative abnormal returns. 
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Table 8 
Abnormal returns for cross-/own-industry spinoff announcements 
The reaction to respectively cross- and own-industry spinoff announcements are measured using cumulative 
abnormal returns as well as buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Both methods with a VW Norwegian market 
index as benchmark. Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a stock 
minus the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day period. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every 21 trading day, and contain 29% cross-industry transactions and 71% own-industry 
transactions over the period 1991-2010. The first day of separate trading for parent companies and subsidiary 
companies are represented by 0 in the table below. 
-210 -4,3 % -1,04 0,4 % 0,24 -4,8 %
-189 -0,5 % -0,08 3,5 % 1,10 -4,0 % -0,71
-168 4,1 % 0,89 6,8 % 1,47 -2,6 % -0,45
-147 2,4 % 0,45 8,2 % 1,57 -5,9 % -0,97
-126 2,3 % 0,36 8,5 % 1,37 -6,2 % -1,05
-105 -1,7 % -0,22 10,5 % 1,54 -12,1 % -1,63
-84 2,3 % 0,33 11,8 % 1,56 -9,4 % -1,08
-63 1,3 % 0,18 14,2 % 1,73* -12,9 % -1,45
-42 0,2 % 0,03 10,2 % 1,15 -9,9 % -1,00
-21 -3,0 % -0,30 11,1 % 1,19 -14,0 % -1,36
0 3,7 % 0,33 19,0 % 1,89* -15,4 % -1,50
aThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean CAR equal zero
bThe t-statistics test if the CAR of the cross-/own-industry spinoffs are significantly different
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
-210 -4,3 % -1,04 0,4 % 0,24 -4,8 %
-189 -2,8 % -0,61 3,2 % 0,98 -5,9 % -1,61
-168 1,3 % 0,23 8,1 % 1,64 -6,8 % -1,78
-147 -0,6 % -0,10 8,0 % 1,56 -8,6 % -2,39*
-126 -0,7 % -0,10 10,3 % 1,51 -11,1 % -3,15**
-105 -2,9 % -0,32 13,2 % 1,61 -16,1 % -3,61***
-84 -1,0 % -0,10 17,1 % 1,57 -18,0 % -4,04***
-63 -3,1 % -0,32 22,9 % 1,65 -25,9 % -3,75***
-42 -2,6 % -0,23 20,2 % 1,39 -22,7 % -2,40**
-21 -2,7 % -0,20 27,0 % 1,30 -29,8 % -2,86***
0 3,1 % 0,21 33,1 % 1,71* -29,9 % -2,79***
aThe t-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean BHAR equal zero
bThe t-statistics test if the BHAR of the cross-/own-industry spinoffs are significantly different
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
Trading 
period
t-stata
Own-industry 
mean         
CAR-231,t
Trading 
period
Own-industry 
mean      
BHAR-231,t
t-stata
Cross-
industry mean      
BHAR-231,t
t-stata
Cross-industry 
minus own-
industry
t-statb
Cross-
industry mean             
CAR-231,t
t-stata
Panel A2 Panel B2 Panel C2
Panel C1Panel B1Panel A1
Cross-industry 
minus own-
industry
t-statb
  
Both panel C1 and C2 (table 8) are reflected by the divergent results between the 
cross- and own-industry transactions. By providing negative returns in the 
comparison of the two portfolios, I find an indication of the opposite of hypothesis 
6 as well. This contradiction is further supported in panel C2, where the test for 
dependent samples generates significant results on a 2% level for the 
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announcement period. Also other trading periods yields severely significant t-
statistics, as presented in the table. However, attention should be dedicated to the 
robustness of these findings due to the relatively small sample size, and the 
inconsistent results compared to the documentation in panel C1. 
 
Other than a t-statistic of 2.11 for the trading period day 0 through day 504 in 
panel A2 table 9, I find the long-run comparison of the cross- and own-industry 
portfolios to contribute with little further statistical support for hypothesis 6. Even 
though this value represents a significance level of 5%, it is not very consistent 
with the remaining results. On the contrary, dependent upon measurement method 
and trading period, my data yields an abnormal post-transaction performance for 
the own-industry subsidiary spinoffs ranging from 36.5% to 71.8%. Both of the 
respective portfolios (panel B1 and B2, table 9) contain statistically significant 
results between 5% and 10% over these periods. Moreover, the cross-industry 
subsidiary spinoffs do not show the same consistency, as they only generate one 
corresponding significant t-statistic (the trading period day 0 through day 756 in 
panel B1). The regressions performed on the portfolios of parent- and 
reconstructed companies in table 9, documents on the other hand no statistically 
relevant findings with respect my sixth hypothesis. 
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Table 9 
Long-run abnormal returns for cross-/own-industry spinoff transactions 
The post-spinoff performance of respectively cross- and own-industry transactions is measured using 
cumulative abnormal returns as well as buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Whereas each of the three groups of 
companies uses different benchmarks. Panel A1/A2 and panel B1/B2 contain firms that are paired against 
individual VW Norwegian industry indexes, whereas the firms in panel C1/C2 are compared against a VW 
Norwegian market index. Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a 
stock minus the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day period. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every 21 trading day, and are based on the final sample of 66 transactions over the period 1991-
2010. The first day of separate trading for parent companies and subsidiary companies are represented by 0 in 
the table below. Finally, the significance levels denoted on the abnormal returns for each portfolio tests the 
hypothesis that the mean CAR or mean BHAR equal zero. 
Mean CAR cross-industry
Mean CAR own-industry
Cross- minus own-industry
t-statistica
Mean BHAR cross-industry
Mean BHAR own-industry
Cross- minus own-industry
t-statisticb
Mean CAR cross-industry
Mean CAR own-industry
Cross- minus own-industry
t-statistica
Mean BHAR cross-industry
Mean BHAR own-industry
Cross- minus own-industry
t-statisticb
Mean CAR cross-industry
Mean CAR own-industry
Cross- minus own-industry
t-statistica
Mean BHAR cross-industry
Mean BHAR own-industry
Cross- minus own-industry
t-statisticb
Cross-industry parent
Own-industry parent
Cross-industry subsidiary
Own-industry subsidiary
aThe t-statistics test if the CAR of the cross-/own-industry spinoffs are significantly different
bThe t-statistics test if the BHAR of the cross-/own-industry spinoffs are significantly different
* Denotes significance at the 10% level
** Denotes significance at the 5% level
*** Denotes significance at the 2% level
12 % 18 % 24 %
15 % 38 % 47 %
Panel D: Companies delisted or acquired
5 % 16 % 21 %
7 % 22 % 31 %
-0,86 1,04 0,63
Panel C1: Reconstructed Companies, cross-industry minus own-industry (CAR)
-5,6 % 4,7 % 13,3 %
8,9 % 2,7 % 4,4 %
-13,6 % 32,7 % 29,1 %
-1,12 0,12 0,45
Panel C2: Reconstructed Companies, cross-industry minus own-industry (BHAR)
-0,2 % 38,7 % 25,8 %
13,4 % 6,0 % -3,3 %
-1,41 -1,54 0,19
Panel B1: Subsidiary Companies, cross-industry minus own-industry (CAR)
5,8 % 50,4 % 71,3%*
36,9%** 43,7%* 44,7%*
-33,8 % 6,6 % 26,6 %
-1,35 0,17 0,55
36,5%** 71,8%** 45,7%*
-45,4 % -66,6 % 14,6 %
10,5 % 0,7 %
-0,14 0,50 0,03
Panel A1: Parent Companies, cross-industry minus own-industry (CAR)
4,5 % 48,9 % 18,6 %
Cross-industry versus own-industry spinoffs
(0-252) (0-504) (0-756)
Panel A2: Parent Companies, cross-industry minus own-industry (BHAR)
-4,6 % -1,1 % -7,0 %
-2,6 % -11,7 % -7,7 %
-2,0 %
0,2 % -12,4 % -16,8 %
-14,5 % 2,0 % 9,0 %
4,3 % 61,4 % 35,4 %
0,40 2,11** 0,65
Panel B2: Subsidiary Companies, cross-industry minus own-industry (BHAR)
-8,9 % 5,2 % 60,4 %
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Lastly, the descriptive statistics in panel D reveals that the sample of own-industry 
subsidiary companies contain the largest frequency of delisting’s and acquisitions. 
As these firms also generate the highest and most significant t-statistics in table 9, 
it might point towards a possible inference with the M&A literature. Nevertheless, 
as previously mentioned, such a theory requires further research in order to draw 
any conclusions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As predicted by business theory, I find that the restructuring through spinoffs has 
a positive effect on shareholder wealth at the Oslo Stock Exchange. Several 
relationships are documented in this thesis, although some of my hypotheses 
provided insignificant results. First of all there is little statistical indication of 
abnormal returns around the spinoff announcements, except from a weakly 
significant result for small fraction transactions. On the contrary, support for 
outperformance is generated by including the finalization of the transactions in my 
regressions. This yields significant results for the whole sample, small fraction 
spinoffs and own-industry spinoffs. 
 
Also the post-spinoff period presents valuable contributions to the conglomerate 
discount theory, through generating significant abnormal returns down at a 2% 
level for the whole sample of subsidiary companies. However, due to the 
transaction similarity, these findings also interact with the literature for IPOs. But 
whereas research on IPOs ((Ritter 1991) and (Loughran and Ritter 1995)) 
documents long-run underperformance, my transactions generates the complete 
opposite effect on shareholder wealth. By separating the spun-off firms based on 
industry and fraction, I only find the own-industry and the small fraction 
transactions to provide long-run significant abnormal returns. 
 
Moreover, the comparison of portfolios suggests that both small fraction spinoffs 
and own-industry spinoffs, outperforms their respective counterparties (large 
fraction and cross-industry) under the announcement period. These results are 
supported by significant t-statistics at the 5% level for the portfolios based on 
fractions, as well as one significant t-statistic at the 2% level for portfolios based 
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on industries. None of the post-spinoff regressions provides on the other hand any 
consistent results, even though I find a couple of weakly significant t-statistics. 
Therefore, my data provides some contradictions to the diversity cost hypothesis 
as well as the proportional value creation hypothesis. Two possible explanations 
for this pattern could however be noise in my sample due to the papers weak 
definition of a spinoff transaction, or the robustness of GICS sector codes as a 
valid measure for diversity. 
 
The anomalies experienced in this thesis, can contribute with valuable knowledge 
to the economic literature. From a corporate management perspective, it enables 
among other things firms and strategists to potentially commit better decisions. 
On the investor side, the restructuring might offer interesting opportunities to 
achieve abnormal returns not justified by the market adjusted risk. Hence, the 
regressions argue against the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
From my thesis, I also identify several possible avenues for future studies. In 
general the research on spinoffs struggles with an explanation for the documented 
effects from this restructuring, whereas many articles have tried to come up with a 
solution. I especially find the relatively high frequency of delisting’s and 
acquisitions in my sample, as an interesting characteristic. Therefore, further 
examinations on whether the spinoff transactions can increase the synergies for 
potential bidders and establish low cost methods to transfer company assets, could 
generate valuable contributions to the economic theory. 
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Introduction 
 
Varying with time, corporate transactions such as divestitures, mergers, 
acquisitions and joint ventures are common approaches in order to execute 
strategies and reallocate resources. The 1950s confidence to economies of scope 
and trend towards increased diversification, where  reversed during the 1980s 
(Comment and Jarrell 1995). Focus on conglomerate discounts and core business 
through restructuring, received on the other hand extensive attention among 
corporations. Managers where urged to streamline and specialize the firms 
operations, whereas Comment and Jarrell (1995) later proved this to be consistent 
with maximization of shareholder wealth. 
 
Additional evidences enhancing the theory of diversified firms trading at a 
discount where documented by Berger and Ofek (1995). Through calculating 
stand alone values for individual business segments within conglomerates, 
significant results revealed the existence of conglomerate discounts. Moreover, 
they found that although tax benefits and increased debt capacity was beneficial if 
successfully implemented, cross subsidization and overinvestment’s contributed 
to a proved average loss between 13% and 15%.  
 
Regarded as the mirror image of mergers, several researchers have proven that 
divestitures generate value (Comment and Jarrell 1995; Vijh 2002; Miles and 
Rosenfeld 1983; Burch and Nanda 2003). However, dependent upon the financial 
situation, the divestiture can either be done as a private or public transaction. A 
frequently used public transaction is spinoff, where a company distributes all of 
the common shares it owns in a controlled subsidiary to its existing shareholders, 
and thereby creating a separate public company. Unlike initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and carveouts, spinoffs do not raise equity through sale of shares to new 
shareholders in the stock market. Thus a spinoff is not a direct action exercised in 
purpose of raising capital and covering liquidity needs for the parent company. 
Furthermore, the transaction forms two separate entities that can easily be 
analysed. 
 
Restructuring through spinoffs are accompanied by severe redeployment of assets 
and corporate governance. Nevertheless, among the transaction motives are: 
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Reduced potential for misallocation of capital, reduced information asymmetry, 
elimination of cross subsidies, prevent agency problems, and enable improved 
investment decisions (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999). On the other hand, 
such as reduced human capital and elimination of synergies might negatively 
affect the firm. 
 
Another interesting characteristic of spinoffs is the subsidiaries similarity to IPOs, 
where both transactions involve newly traded shares in the market. But whereas 
comprehensive research, including (Ritter 1991) and (Loughran and Ritter 1995), 
reveals severe long-run underperformance of IPOs, less knowledge has been 
obtained for spinoffs. Nevertheless (Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge 1993) found 
significantly positive long-run abnormal returns for these firms. 
 
In this thesis I examine the value created through spinoffs at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE) over the period 1988-2009. The study will start out by looking 
for abnormal return around announcement of transaction. However, due to limited 
access of exact announcement-date for several firms, a proxy representing this 
period will be generated. Thereafter the paper investigates the long-run 
performance for the parent company, subsidiary company and an artificial 
reconstruction of the original firm. 
 
By determining whether spinoffs increases shareholder wealth, researchers 
contributes with valuable knowledge for the economic literature. Among other 
things, it enables firms, investors and strategists to commit better decisions. 
Although the spinoff-effect has already been widely proved, less research has 
been done in the Norwegian market. Furthermore, if the data yields significant 
long-run abnormal returns, as suggested by literature, it will not only support 
previous theories. This contradicts the basic assumption of efficient markets 
stating that investors, on average, should not be able to earn a return higher than 
justified by the market risk of the investment (Fama 1991). Moreover it could be a 
valuable contribution for investors trying to predict future stock returns, and 
thereby earning excess returns on their investments.  
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Literature Review 
 
Along with an increasing focus on core business through restructuring and 
conglomerate discounts, researchers have tried to investigate the value created 
through spinoffs. However, the literature is still characterized by lack of 
knowledge, especially when it comes to hypotheses explaining the origins of 
abnormal returns from equity carveouts and spinoffs. Nevertheless, in this section 
I will highlight some of the most relevant research, which constitutes the 
foundation for the empirical design of my thesis.  
 
Spinoff Announcements 
Based on 55 securities listed in the US market over the period 1963-1980, Miles 
and Rosenfeld (1983) found that voluntary spinoff announcements had a positive 
effect on shareholder wealth. Including the full 181-day observation period, they 
also found that abnormal returns where significant for both preceding interval and 
announcement day. Furthermore they discovered that these announcements where 
usually followed up by a period of positive abnormal returns. This was in striking 
contrast to previous research on voluntary selloffs, showing no significant 
influence on the stock prices of divesting firms. Finally their work found that 
large spinoffs had a stronger positive effect on shareholder wealth relative to 
small spinoffs. 
 
Hite and Owers (1983) also discovered evidence for positive abnormal returns, 
from 50 days prior to the announcement through completion of the spinoff. 
Nevertheless, by extending the sample to account for transaction rationales, 
positive gains existed for firms that facilitated mergers or that separated diverse 
operating units. Companies responding to legal and/or regulatory difficulties 
experienced on the other hand negative gains. By looking at a two-day interval 
surrounding the first press announcement the researchers found positive and 
significant results for all categories. However, they did not find support for their 
theory that the stockholder gain represented wealth transfers from senior security 
holders such as bondholders and preferred stockholders. 
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Predictions explaining spinoff gains 
In order to narrow down the reasons for proved announcement effects, Davidson 
Iii and McDonald (1987) examined transactions which created royalty trusts. By 
doing so, they could observe the effect of having an explicit tax benefit lying 
behind the spinoff. This yielded presence of large and significant abnormal returns 
for the days surrounding the announcement of trust creation. The elimination of 
double taxation on trust income should in their point of view be sufficient to 
create this value. 
 
Allen, Lummer et al. (1995) combined spinoff discoveries with previous research 
on acquisitions, by processing a hypothesis called ―correction-of-a-mistake‖. They 
explored whether the excess stock returns around spinoff announcements could be 
attributed to the reversal of prior takeover losses. This re-creation of value 
destroyed theory, contained three predictions: (1) ―The acquirer’s stock price 
reaction around the announcement of a takeover that later becomes a spinoff is 
negative‖; (2) ―the average stock price reaction around spinoffs of prior 
acquisitions is more positive than the average stock price reaction around spinoffs 
generally‖; (3) ―the stock price reaction around the announcement of spinoffs of 
prior acquisitions is positive, but is negatively correlated with the stock price 
reaction around the original acquisition‖ (Allen et al. 1995). Through analyzing 
their sample, statistical significance where only found for the first and third 
predictions. Thereby, suggesting that unsuccessful acquisitions could potentially 
be corrected through a reversal of the earlier transaction. 
 
Daley, Mehrotra et al (1997)  tested a theoretical prediction claiming that cross-
industry spinoff distributions created more value than own-industry spinoffs. This 
was simply done using the standard industrial classification (SIC) system made by 
the United States Government. Not surprisingly, their results indicated significant 
value creation around the announcement of cross industry spinoffs only. This was 
in line with the hypothesis for corporate focus, conglomerate discounts and 
consistent with previous results from asset sale studies. However, they also 
investigated whether the observed value increase could be related to cross-
subsidizing of poorly performing units and/or improvements in operating 
performance. Although cross-subsidizing proved to be insignificant, 
improvements in operating-return-on-assets was statistical significant for cross-
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industry spinoffs. The research therefore supported the prediction that increased 
corporate focus has a positive effect on shareholder wealth. 
 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) emphasized the more unexplored 
explanations for conglomerate discounts suggested by practitioners and press. 
Based on their theories they investigated the so called information hypothesis, 
proposing that spinoffs increase shareholder wealth by mitigating information 
asymmetry about the company. This involves increased clarity for both cash flows 
and operating efficiency, for the individual divisions within the firm. In inequality 
to separate entities, they claimed that underperformance in one unit of a 
conglomerate would spill over and affect other units. Empirical analysis’s showed 
that firms engaging in spinoffs had higher levels of information asymmetry before 
the transaction compared to industry matched counterparts. However, as 
predicted, significant reduction in information asymmetry was documented after 
completion of the spinoff. Controlled for negative synergies between divisions, 
further studies discovered a positive relationship between the degree of 
information asymmetry and gain in firm value. Moreover they found increased 
probability for spinoff transactions if the company had liquidity needs or high 
growth opportunities. Nevertheless, in the two year post-period, significantly 
more capital was raised both in amount and frequency. This is consistent with 
Dierkens (1991) findings that firms time their equity issue announcement when 
their information asymmetry is relatively low. 
 
Through loss of collateral and reduced liquidation value, Parrino (1997) argued 
that spinoffs increased the riskiness of the bondholders claim. By studying the 
Marriott spinoff in 1993, he discovered both a decline in the overall firm value as 
well as a wealth transfer from senior security holders to shareholders. In order to 
find systematic evidence supporting this wealth expropriation hypothesis, 
Maxwell and Rao (2003), collected comprehensive data on spinoff 
announcements. Consistent with the ―Mariott Case‖, significant results proved 
that bondholders on average received a negative abnormal return. This 
emphasized a wealth transfer from bondholders to common stockholders and was 
a breakthrough for the corporate focus literature. However, unlike Parrino’s 
(1997) findings, the total firm value increased on a spinoff announcement. This 
advocated that the wealth expropriation hypothesis was only a partial explanation 
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for the stockholder gain. Additionally Maxwell and Rao (2003) where able to find 
several relationships:  (1) ―The loss of collateral, measured by the relative size of 
the spunoff firm, is positively related to stockholder returns and is negatively 
related to bondholder returns‖; (2) ―the risk of a firm’s debt, measured by bond 
rating and leverage ratios, negatively influences bondholder returns‖; (3) 
―consistent with a loss to bondholders, firms are more likely to have their credit 
rating downgraded than upgraded after a spinoff‖; (4) ―consistent with the wealth 
transfer hypothesis, losses to bondholders tend to be more severe, the larger the 
gains to shareholders‖ (Maxwell and Rao 2003). 
 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2008) re-examined the stockholder-bondholder 
conflict proposed by earlier research on corporate spinoffs. Through contradicting 
both Maxwell and Rao (2003) and Parrino (1997), they claimed that the wealth 
transfer theory was inconsistent with more modern markets. Based on data 
covering the period from 1995 to 2002, evidence showed that both stocks and 
straight bonds experienced significant abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement. Moreover, by dividing the bond sample in two sub-periods, they 
observed insignificant negative abnormal returns between 1995 and 1997, 
whereas positive and significant results where proven in the period 1998-2002. 
The discovery thereby suggested that previous experiences had resulted in an 
immunization and adaption against the stockholder-bondholder conflict. 
 
By using a spinoff sample, Burch and Nanda (2003) explored the field of 
conglomerate discounts and diversity costs. They where able to address 
improvements in overall value, through reconstructing the original firm after the 
transaction and use market-to-book values for diversity. This approach raised 
critique against previous research, claiming that methods relying on standard 
industrial classification (SIC) system could yield noisy and biased results. 
Nevertheless, improvement in excess value, where proved by Burch and Nanda to 
be an implication of both reductions in diversity and changes in investment 
policy. Thereby valuable support was given to the theory of conglomerate 
discounts and the diversity cost hypothesis.  
 
Consistent with previous research, Ahn and Denis (2004) observed an increase in 
firm value and an elimination of the conglomerate discount following spinoffs. 
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Evidence where provided supporting the inefficient investment hypothesis, 
arguing that changes in investment policy contributed to these well investigated 
discoveries. Through studying changes in investment allocations within 
conglomerates, they found a significant increase in investment efficiency after the 
divestiture. In line with this, reliable relationship where provided between change 
in firm value around the spinoff and change in investment efficiency. Finally they 
concluded that improved investment efficiency could not solely account for the 
change in excess value.  
  
Long-run stock market performance following spinoffs 
Cusatis, Miles et al. (1993) extended the previous research made on abnormal 
returns around spinoff announcements, to include long-run performance. Since 
both initial public offerings (IPOs) and spinoff subsidiaries represents newly 
traded securities in the market, equal characteristics would be reasonable. 
However, unlike IPOs who appears to underperform the market (Ritter 1991), 
they found that spinoff subsidiaries, parent companies and a reconstruction of the 
original firms yielded significant long-run abnormal returns. By working on the 
prediction that these findings were an implication of restructuring activity, they 
discovered an unusually high frequency of takeovers for both the spinoffs and 
parents. As previous empirical results shows that target shareholders on average 
receives 30 percent premiums over their stock’s announcement price (Koller et 
al.), the abnormal return was positive but insignificant when removing the firms 
involved in takeover. Along with these striking results, critics were raised stating 
that earlier research had underestimated the effect on shareholder wealth created 
by spinoffs. Cusatis, Miles et al. (1993) therefore interfered with the merging and 
acquisition literature, suggesting that spinoffs increased synergies for potential 
bidders and established low-cost methods to transfer company assets. 
 
Desai and Jain (1999) supported the research performed by Daley, Mehrotra et al 
(1997), claiming that cross-industry spinoff distributions created more value than 
own-industry spinoffs. However, these studies did not include the post-spinoff 
long-run stock market performance. Based on this, further investigation was 
dedicated directly to the corporate focus literature. In line with their expectations, 
significant results viewed that focus-increasing spinoffs provided larger abnormal 
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return than non-focus-increasing spinoffs for both the announcement period as 
well as in the long-run. By running cross-sectional regressions, stock market 
performance and operating performance proved to be significantly related to 
change in focus. Finally they discovered that companies implementing non-focus-
increasing spinoffs were often motivated by separating poorly performing 
subsidiaries. Debt reduction, transferring of debt and financial distress, were on 
the other hand insignificant fields for these transactions. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Previous research on different stock exchanges over the world, presents 
significant results concluding that spinoff announcements has a positive effect on 
shareholder wealth. As addressed in the literature review, several hypotheses seek 
to explain this anomaly. Nevertheless, no paper has managed to find an exact 
factor solely accounting for the proved abnormal returns. However, based on all 
this empirical research, I formulate the first hypothesis which I expect to yield 
significant results at Oslo Stock Exchange as well: 
  
Hypothesis 1; 
“Companies experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement of 
spinoffs” 
 
Additionally, with inspiration from more modern discoveries, I also wish to 
investigate the long-run stock market performance following spinoffs. Associated 
with severe restructuring activity, post-spinoff findings indicate that market 
participants underestimate the shareholder wealth created through spinoffs. I 
thereby form further expectations of long-run abnormal returns following spinoffs 
for up to three years. By constituting the foundation for my remaining research at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange, I formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2; 
“Parent companies experience positive abnormal return over an extended period 
following the spinoffs” 
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Hypothesis 3; 
“Subsidiary companies experience positive abnormal return over an extended 
period following the spinoffs” 
 
Hypothesis 4; 
“The parent-subsidiary combinations experience positive abnormal return over 
an extended period following the spinoffs” 
 
 
Data 
 
With assistance from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) administration, I where able 
to obtain a complete list over reported spinoffs at the OSE in the period between 
1985 and 2010. However, by only containing security id of parent company and 
date of event (completion of the spinoff takes place), a comprehensive data search 
where required. In order to obtain the spinoff subsidiary, I went through both the 
Oslo Stock Information (OBI) database and news archives. This yielded a total of 
94 transactions, whereas many of them probably will be excluded due to statistical 
interactions with the methodology in this thesis. 
 
Based on Mitchell and Stafford (2000) asserting that daily returns might generate 
noise in the test statistics, I retrieve monthly stock returns and market values using 
Datastream, by Thomson Reuters. My sample reaches from 11 months prior to 
completion of the spinoff, through 36 months after the transaction. Due to several 
varying sequences of price-sensitive announcements and press-releases in the pre-
spinoff interval, the individual announcement periods have different lengths of 
time. Unfortunately, all this relevant information is not available for my sample of 
securities, forcing me to use a proxy representing the announcement period. 
 
In order to measure the companies’ performance, I employ several benchmarks 
described more comprehensive in the methodology. However, Oslo Børs All-
Share Index (OSEAX) and the different industry indexes, along with each 
company’s industry classification code were also extracted from Datastream. 
Moreover, by continuing the OBI database and news archives search, information 
Preliminary Thesis GRA 1902  01.09.2011 
Page 10 
concerning acquisitions, delisting and other corporate transactions during my 
observation period was gathered. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Several approaches are available in order to measure abnormal stock returns, 
whereas comprehensive research addresses the empirical power and test statistics 
in these methodologies. With pros and cons for each technique, the literature 
contains inconsistent results for preferred methodology. Nevertheless, statistical 
inference can either be drawn from a calendar-time framework (factor/market 
models) or an event-time framework (buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns). Although a substantial difference in anomalies, 
they all struggle with a common problem pointed out by defenders of market 
efficiency: The sample and their actual returns must be compared to some kind of 
benchmark containing ―normal returns‖. Choice of benchmark and framework is 
difficult to justify and may easily lead to biased test statistics. Based on this I will 
start out by shortly review some of the most recognized methodology 
contributions constituting the foundation for my statistics. 
 
By criticizing the matched firm technique for not adequately adjust for risk, Espen 
Eckbo, Masulis et al. (2000)  accused this method of generating seriously biased 
estimates. On the other hand, they highlighted the factor model as a more reliable 
tool for measuring long-run abnormal stock returns. This was in striking contrast 
to previous research by Barber and Lyon (1997), claiming that the method of 
matching sample firms to control firms yielded well-specified test statistics in 
random samples. Moreover Barber and Lyon (1997), argued that the use of 
reference portfolios could generate test statistics that are misspecified. However, 
in this paper I will calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) as well as 
the equally weighted (EW) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) both of 
them with a reference portfolio as a benchmark. By doing so the misspecification 
of test statistics can largely be traced to: New listing bias, rebalancing bias and 
skewness bias (Barber and Lyon 1997). 
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The benchmark-adjusted return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
for firm i in period t are expressed in the following way: 
                        
           
 
   
 
Furthermore, in order to calculate the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return I take 
the equally weighted (EW) average of the individual CARs: 
     
 
 
      
 
   
 
Although Lyon, Barber et al. (1999) favors the methodology of BHAR, they 
highlights that the CAR approach yields less skewed abnormal returns. Suffering 
mostly from new listing bias, less statistical problems arises when processing the 
data. On the other hand, the CAR struggles with sampling biases (size, book-to-
market, pre-event returns, calendar clustering, industry clustering and overlapping 
returns) and can be biased predictors of BHARs (Barber and Lyon 1997). This 
might lead to incorrect inferences. Furthermore, Barber and Lyon (1997) claims 
that the indicated magnitude of wealth created does not correspond to returns 
generated by the benchmark. 
 
The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) is expressed in the following way: 
 
                   
 
   
                  
 
   
 
Whereas the Mean Buy-and-Hold abnormal return contains the equally weighted 
(EW) average of the individual BHARs: 
      
 
 
       
 
   
 
By conducting estimates for abnormal returns that easily reflects investors’ 
experiences, researchers seem to prefer BHAR. Moreover, as previously 
mentioned, Barber and Lyon (1997) argues that CAR is a biased predictor of 
BHAR. The measure suffers mostly from rebalancing biases and skewness biases, 
generally yielding negative bias in the test statistics.  
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Preferably I would like to measure abnormal returns using both market models 
and benchmarks such as: The CAPM model, Fama & French 3-Factor model, a 
six-factor model with prespecified macroeconomic factors suggested by Espen 
Eckbo, Masulis et al. (2000), different reference portfolios and matched-firms. 
However, due to limitations of my dataset (such as lack of book-to-market ratios) 
and the paper, I will compare the spinoff returns with two different benchmarks: 
 Announcement period returns will be compared against a value-weighted 
(VW) index including the most liquid stocks on the OSE. Based on Oslo 
Børs All-share Index (OSEAX), containing all firms trading at OSE, I will 
exclude the 10% smallest firms inhibiting the liquidity. Moreover, by 
contributing with unique risk that reduces diversity, companies with 
considerably large market capitalization will be removed as well 
(Loughran and Ritter 2000). The intuition behind this benchmark is that 
pre-spinoff companies are on average more diversified than the post-
spinoff companies. 
 As mentioned previously, firms generally increases focus on core business 
through spinoffs. This implies that individual industry indexes yields a 
good benchmark for measuring parent and subsidiary long-run 
performance. On the other hand, post-spinoff returns for the reconstructed 
firms will be compared with the same benchmark as for abnormal returns 
around announcement. 
 
Moreover, attention should be dedicated to the possibility that some of the 
benchmarks could be influenced by the spinoff-events themselves. Oslo Stock 
Exchange reported 206 listed companies in 2010, developed from 93 listed 
companies in 1980. This combined with irregularities in number of transactions 
each year, implies that the fraction of spinoffs will vary with time. Finally, further 
studies including empirical results and conclusions will be addressed in the master 
thesis. 
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